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 One of the richest resources of which I am aware for thinking about democracy is John 
Dewey’s many works on the subject, not least of which is Democracy and Education. It is not 
for nothing that Dewey was called the “Philosopher of Democracy.” In Democracy and 
Education he describes democracy as a “way of life,” which is to say that it is something more 
than a type of process for organizing political power and selecting people for political office. 
Political structure and elections are not trivial matters, of course, but if democracy is to be 
understood as a way of life then they are not the whole of democracy. In the same book Dewey 
offered the basis of a definition of democracy. The most significant component of that definition 
is, to paraphrase a bit, the pursuit of common interests with those outside one’s immediate 
community. In the sense meant here, “community” could be defined in terms of a wide range of 
criteria. It could be understood as class, or as race, or gender, or ethnicity, or neighborhood, or 
nationality, or any one of a number of other traits. A democratic individual in this sense is 
someone who is inclined to look beyond his community to seek common ground, common 
interests, with members of other communities; a democratic society is one that is characterized 
by public policies and social habits that promote the pursuit of shared interests across its many 
internal boundaries and beyond its national borders. 
In order for such an individual and such a society to thrive there must be certain 
characteristics that predominate. The society, for example, must encourage education and it must 
encourage communication. With respect to the first, Dewey went to great lengths, as have a 
number of others, for example John McDermott, to develop a conception of education that is 
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likely to help people develop the understanding and the habits that will enable them to live as 
democratic individuals. It is not an easy ideal to fulfill. A democratic individual is 
knowledgeable, thoughtful, critical, experimental, and ethically sensitive. As difficult an ideal as 
this may be, it is what a democracy requires, and education, or the schools, is the one social 
institution best able to engender the result. 
With respect to communication, it is difficult to overstate its importance in a society that 
aspires to be democratic. The relative absence of communication is to that extent an 
approximation of fascism. If we think in terms of communication among individuals, groups and 
constituencies within a society, a democracy should be expected to promote an interest in and 
familiarity with one another. Any failure to do so is equivalent to promoting or at least tolerating 
a degree of isolation that breeds suspicion, distrust, even hatred, which in turn provides the social 
foundations of fascism. A democratic society simply can not tolerate such conditions, not if it 
seriously desires to advance and strengthen its democratic character. Similarly, a democratic 
society should promote an interest in and familiarity with those beyond national borders. 
Xenophobia has no more place in a democratic society than do internal hatreds or mutual 
ignorance of one another. A democratic society is, to put it differently, necessarily 
internationalist in its orientation. It promotes international understanding, the study of foreign 
languages, cosmopolitan values, international cooperation, and diplomacy; in short, it pursues 
common interests with those beyond its borders. This is not easy to do, anymore than educating 
for a democratic society is easy to do, especially in a somewhat hostile environment. Finding 
common ground with friends is much easier than finding common ground with those one sees as 
hostile. Nonetheless, this is what is required. 
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Such traits are what a thick democracy is made of. But this is simply a matter of 
definition, and does not raise the question whether democracy in this sense is desirable. Dewey 
certainly thought so; in fact he thought that it is the only social arrangement appropriate to free 
and developing individuals, societies and nations. I would not like to get too far into the question 
of whether democracy is a desirable condition. I would prefer, if you will permit me, simply to 
stipulate that it is desirable, on the grounds that an individual who is knowledgeable, thoughtful, 
critical, experimental, and ethically sensitive is preferable to one who is not, and a society that 
values public policies and social habits that promote the pursuit of shared interests across internal 
and external borders is preferable to one that does not. 
The question that interests me concerns the prospects for and limits of democracy in this 
sense. As a logical possibility one could say that the prospects for meeting the conditions of such 
a thick democracy are not bad. There is nothing inherently contradictory about it, and though it is 
a high ideal, history is full of examples of ideals that at one time seemed absurdly unrealistic but 
that have come to dominate. The elimination of slavery, the end of absolute monarchy, and even 
the prevalence of republics are among the more obvious such examples. Slavery, monarchy and 
aristocracies were once natural and necessary features of social life, and now they are neither. 
Individual and social freedoms in the forms represented by the demise of slavery, monarchy and 
aristocracy are now the standards against which we measure social and individual life, and there 
is nothing about thick democracy that precludes it from becoming such a standard in the future. 
So as a logical possibility the prospects are good. What about as a realistic possibility? 
Here things are somewhat trickier, especially in the short run. One reason, the importance of 
which is not to be underestimated, is that the term “democracy” has been so badly abused in 
recent years that in some parts of the world it will take a long time for it even to be meaningfully 
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legitimate again. Democracy has meant the free reign of the market and the many predations that 
has brought about. In Russia in the ‘90s it meant the rape of social assets and the impoverishment 
of millions of people. And in many places around the world, Iraq being only the most obvious, it 
has meant the political and military domination of the United States, with which even many of 
America’s allies are fed up. Nominally and substantially democracy is in need of rehabilitation 
before it can serve as a forceful ideal again, never mind becoming a reality. 
There are other problems as well, among them the fact that we do not do very well the 
things that are necessary for the development of democratic individuals and societies, notably 
education and communication. There are very few societies in which more than a small number 
of schools educate in the manner that Dewey would have described as appropriate for democratic 
conditions. Those that do exist, by virtue of their small number and by their tendency to 
academic elitism or to cater to the rich, reach very few students. In many countries there is also a 
problem with a sharp differentiation between academic and vocational schooling, a distinction by 
the way that Dewey deplored and that he discussed to very good effect in Democracy and 
Education. Attending to education remains one of the more important aspects of a social policy 
that can contribute to the growth of democracy. 
The situation with respect to communication is little better. One of the more important 
forms in which communication occurs in contemporary societies is the traditional publicly 
accessible print and broadcast media. Just how these media can best serve the interests of 
communication within a democratic society is not easy to specify. It is easier, though, to indicate 
some of what they should avoid if they want to play any sort of salutary role in democratic 
development. For one thing they should avoid passing along information from the powerful to 
the benighted that they know to be false. Had The New York Times and other media outlets 
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followed this simple policy in 2002 and early 2003 there may well not have been an invasion of 
Iraq. Along similar lines, media outlets, with the exception of editorial pages and journals of 
opinion, need to avoid overt political partisanship. Both print and broadcast media have a 
problem in this respect. The problem is in fact bigger than simply political partisanship, and it 
has to do with the difficulties created by privately, especially corporately, owned media. If media 
outlets allow or encourage themselves to give voice to the interests of their owners, or to the 
political forces that represent the interests of their owners, then they are overwhelmingly unlikely 
to be able to provide the means of communication that a democracy needs. This Fox News 
version of broadcasting is more than a nuisance in contemporary American and other media 
environments. However we express the ideal media traits in a democratic society it surely does 
not include much of the behavior we currently see. It has been suggested that electronic 
journalism such as blogging is creating new conditions for communication of the sort that will 
better meet democratic expectations. This may in fact be true, though we have to see how it 
develops. 
There are a number of stumbling blocks, then, to the actualization of individual and social 
life approaching thick democracy. I mention all this not to create a mood of pessimism, rather 
simply to clear away the brush, so to speak. We cannot talk about the prospects for democratic 
development in a naïve, Pollyannaish way if we want to say anything meaningful or useful, so it 
is necessary to point out the problems. But the problems do not describe the whole situation, or 
even most of it. For all of the bad education, the miscommunication, the lies, the violence and 
the abuse of power let loose in the world, the fact is that there are good reasons to be optimistic 
about the prospects for democracy. 
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First, even with respect to those areas that have been identified as problems, i.e. 
education and communication, there continues to be debate, dispute and struggle concerning 
them. In education and schooling, it may turn out to be a surprising virtue that we in fact have 
little idea what we are doing. I mean to say that for all the scholarship around teaching, 
educational mission, school organization, evaluation and educational administration, we really 
do not know how best to prepare good teachers, how best to organize and fund schools, how to 
evaluate their success, or for that matter how to determine what they should be doing. I say that 
this is a virtue because at the very least it keeps the issues alive. In the United States for example, 
there is a periodic outcry about the failure of our schools to educate properly, and the related 
failure of our teacher education institutions to prepare great teachers. There is of course 
controversy about all this, but pretty much everyone agrees that we can do all these things better 
than we now do them. The result is what appears to be a never ending experimentation with 
respect to curriculum, the structure of teacher education programs, the content and format of 
textbooks, and with the organization of schools and school systems. As is the case with 
experiments, even of the carefully controlled scientific sort which these are not, the results are 
often not what we would hope. But that is the nature of experimentation, and it is far better that 
we keep trying, even if we fail most of the time, than that we rest content with whatever 
inadequacies we currently have. The ongoing attempt to do it all better, even in a politically 
charged and often ideological context, is what gives us hope that over time we can approximate 
an education suitable for democratic conditions. There is no guarantee of course, and it is not 
necessarily the case that there will be progress. But the future remains open, or “in the making” 
as William James would have it, and that is reason enough to be hopeful. 
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The case with communication is perhaps even more hopeful. There are considerable 
dangers out there in the corporate consolidation of media outlets. But this too is a point of 
contention and struggle. There are more than a few groups, if we again consider the situation in 
the United States, that are struggling to keep the airwaves open and available to as wide a range 
of voices as possible, and to prevent media markets from being dominated by only a handful of 
corporate owners. It is a political and economic battle to be sure, but the battle is being waged. 
And here the new electronic media forms and outlets are particularly important. They represent 
ways that people, individually and collectively, can make their way around the consolidated and 
compromised traditional media to maintain and strengthen the communicative possibilities that 
democratic society requires. Of course progress in this situation is no more guaranteed than it is 
in education, but it is possible, and so there remains more than simply naïve hope. 
But what are the prospects with respect to the definitional criterion of democracy that 
Dewey offered, i.e. the pursuit of common interests across community and national boundaries? 
Here too there is reason for hope. Let us look first at what are roughly internal matters. On the 
one hand we are all aware of the many seriously and too often deadly tensions that remain 
among various racial or ethnic communities, though the tensions are rarely if ever simply ethnic 
or racial, i.e. there are generally historical, economic and political elements as well: Albanian 
and Serb, Hutu and Tutsi, Jewish and Palestinian, Han and Tibetan. In the United States today it 
is possible though by no means certain that Barack Obama will lose the presidential election 
largely because he is black. So I do not mean to overlook the serious problems that exist. But on 
the other hand, if you will permit me a lapse into Hegelianism, the Zeitgeist appears to be 
moving in a hopeful direction. In the United States, though the problem and consequences of 
racism are real enough, they are no longer nearly as bad as they were in the not distant past. The 
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body of law that interferes with personal and institutional racism is growing in bulk and in its 
effect, and opportunities for people are expanding as well. The fact that the Democratic Party is 
about to nominate a black man for the presidency has considerable symbolic value, even if it 
may be too easy to overemphasize. In many respects America is being brought into a more 
genuine multicultural and bilingual incarnation. It is true that many Americans are being dragged 
into it kicking and screaming, but it is happening nonetheless. Something similar is going on in 
the UK, in France, in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. Latin America represents another set of 
processes and in some respects models. New Zealand has embraced Maori traditions and cultures 
in surprising ways, and for all its problems South Africa remains a hopeful symbol and reality. 
Though it has its own problems with respect to race and ethnicity, Russia has been for a very 
long time and remains today a multicultural and multilingual society from which in many 
respects the rest of us could learn something. 
All this bears on the question of the pursuit of common interests across internal 
boundaries and among communities within individual nations. The examples I have mentioned 
are all democracies of one kind or another and to varying degrees, and in each of them processes 
are underway through which individuals and communities are, either by necessity or design, 
gradually coming to regard one another as partners in shared hopes and aspirations. The overt 
repressions and exclusions of the past are much harder to find. If this process continues more or 
less along these lines then the conditions for more robust and stronger democracies will be 
expanded. This is not to say that there are not still serious problems of racism and other 
impediments to the pursuit of common interests across various boundaries, but the movement is 
for the most part in the direction that thick democracy needs. 
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The situation is at least equally encouraging with respect to the pursuit of common 
interests across national borders. In the United States one of the very few happy consequences of 
the neoconservatives’ spectacularly failed penchant for preemptive war has been the rediscovery 
of the virtues of diplomacy. In the past three years several influential figures in the American 
foreign policy establishment have published books in which they urge the return to serious 
diplomacy as the cornerstone of any nation’s international relations, among them Richard Haass, 
Francis Fukuyama and Zbigniew Brzezinski. As important as this is, however, even the serious 
exercise of diplomacy is well short of a Deweyan pursuit of common interests. 
The reason is that the theoretical underpinning of traditional, realist diplomacy is that the 
international environment is basically a Hobbesian “state of nature.” The root metaphor for 
Hobbes, and for most of the rest of the theories in every field that arose in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, is the mechanical view of nature in which entities distinct in their nature and essence 
from one another interact mechanically according to a set of natural laws. On this understanding, 
nations in the international state of nature are distinct in their nature and essence from one 
another and interact with one another in a “war of all against all.” International relations and 
foreign policy, understood on the basis of this metaphor, is the expression of the laws of the 
interactions of nations such that violent collisions are kept to a minimum and the essentially 
distinct interests of each is advanced as much as possible. 
Thick democracy of a Deweyan sort, however, rests on an entirely different root 
metaphor. The reason it makes sense for Dewey to think in terms of common interests is that for 
him, and for pragmatic naturalism generally, all entities are constituted by their relations with 
one another. Dewey’s metaphor is not atoms in a void but rather an ecosystem. In an ecosystem 
the systemic interrelations of the constituents determine the nature of the constituents 
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themselves. In this light, the environment in which nation states exist is not a Hobbesian state of 
nature and war of all against all but a relationally determined state of affairs in which the nature 
of each is determined by its complex interactions with the others. Understood this way it makes 
no sense to conceive of national interests as independently determined and then advanced in a 
competition with other nations. The character and interests of any nation arise in an often dense 
and shifting complex of relations with one another. If that is the case, then traditional realist 
diplomacy, as preferable as it is to vicious neoconservative imperial fantasies, is not good 
enough. 
One of the implications of shifting the metaphor on the basis of which we understand 
international relations is that a profound revision in our conception of national sovereignty is 
necessary. If the character and interests of nations are understood to arise in their interrelations 
then a much looser conception of sovereignty is called for. To their credit even some of the 
traditional realists we have mentioned, Haass and Fukuyama specifically, have called for a 
“sacrifice” of some degree of national sovereignty in the interest of addressing pressing world 
problems. But their own realist underpinnings prevent them from going far enough. In the end, 
the pursuit of common interests across national borders that defines a thick democracy leads to a 
downgrading of the importance of national borders, and therefore nation states, altogether. In the 
interest of thick democracy, to put the point more starkly, the era of the nation state needs to be 
brought to a close. 
When put that baldly, thick democracy may seem on the face of it to be either a bad idea 
or at the very best hopelessly utopian, but neither is true. For one thing, the most serious 
contemporary problems are not national but international, for example terrorism, the 
environment, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the availability of clean water, human rights 
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and energy, and the only way they can be addressed is if nations realize their common interests 
with respect to them and behave accordingly. This in turn will require treating national 
sovereignty as a secondary value at best and the collective solutions of the problems as primary. 
This means that gradually diminishing the importance of nation states in the interest of reaching 
solutions to our serious problems is not only not a bad thing, it is a necessity. 
Nor is the demise of the preeminence of the nation state merely a utopian dream. On a 
theoretical level, cosmopolitanism of the Kantian and Rawlsian as well as of the pragmatist 
varieties is receiving sustained attention. More importantly, nations themselves have for nearly a 
century been in the process, though an admittedly halting one, of coming to terms with the 
necessity of ever deeper and more serious forms of international cooperation and indeed 
integration. The League of Nations, the United Nations, the World and International Criminal 
Courts, and such international economic agreements as NAFTA have been responses to the 
perceived necessity of interweaving our political, economic and cultural lives. Each of these 
efforts has received and continues to receive strong and serious criticism, and one hopes that in 
their responses to the criticism they will improve. And in fact there is no reason to think that the 
clock will be turned back to an earlier time, despite ongoing efforts of some to do so. 
The most stunning illustration of the fact that we have entered an era in which the nation 
state will recede in importance is the European Union. By the middle of the 20th century Europe 
had exhausted itself in its murderous and suicidal wars. If there was ever evidence of the 
ultimately ruinous nature of the nation state’s effort to advance its interests at others’ expense, it 
was the condition in which Europe found itself in 1945. Through the initial coal and steel 
agreement through the EEC to the European Union in its current form, European nations have 
gradually integrated their economies, currencies, higher education through the Bologna process 
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and the movement of people in the Schengen Zone, to the point that to a large extent there are 
practically few borders left in most of continental Europe. For the first time in history nation 
states are willingly, in some cases even eagerly, abandoning considerable degrees of national 
sovereignty in the interests of a more integrated union and the collective solution of common 
problems. The EU, with all its faults and overbearing bureaucracy, is an example of world 
historic importance of the pursuit of common interests across borders, and is therefore an 
example of a thick, Deweyan democracy in the making. The demise of the nation state is not a 
utopian dream. It is already a reality, and a process that will most likely continue to develop into 
the foreseeable future. It is not too outlandish to imagine something like the EU developing in 
North America, though it would do so against stiff opposition. South American nations may well 
go in similar directions, and the future of East Asia is itself one of a range of possibilities. 
The good news, for those of us who think that a thick, Deweyan democracy is an end 
worth advancing, is that the process is well underway. It is flawed process to be sure, with all 
sorts of setbacks and inadequacies, but it is happening. And all its problems notwithstanding, the 
prospects for its success are, it seems to me, rather good. 
